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Abstract 
The paper presents a detailed error analysis and 
classification of the behavior of an open-source router, 
when affected by Single Event Upsets (SEUs). The 
experimental results have been gathered on a real 
communication network, resorting to an ad-hoc Fault 
Injection system. The injector has been designed to 
corrupt the router during its normal service and to analyze 
the SEU injection effects on the overall distributed system. 
The performed experiments allowed the authors to 
identify the most critical memory regions and to cluster 
the router variables according to their impact on system 
dependability. 
1. Introduction 
The increased use of computer systems in applications 
that require very high dependability is now widespread 
and commonly accepted.  
We are nowadays entering a world of global 
communications, in which a multi-faceted variety of 
services, ranging from the simple voice transmission to the 
real-time exchange of enormous volumes of data, is 
offered to a potentially huge number of customers.  
Examples of these services include video-conferencing, 
Web browsing, VoIP, but there is a general feeling that the 
new communication systems will trigger the expansion of 
many kinds of services that are today completely 
unforeseen.  
One of the crucial points of this revolution is 
represented by the deployment of wide-band reliable 
communication infrastructures. This appears to be as one 
of the major challenges for the communication society. 
The deployment of global communication systems that 
ensure adequate levels of performance and dependability 
in data communications is a conditio sine qua non for the 
opening of the new scenarios of the future service society.  
The quality of services accessed through a 
communication network may be impaired by the 
malfunctioning that arises from failures of the 
hardware/software network infrastructure components, as 
well as from the erroneous behavior/interaction of the 
applications that use the network to transfer the data.  
Since from an economical point of view hardware 
redundancy is not always the most practical solution, the 
use of dependable software techniques is an effective and 
low-cost solution to develop high dependable 
communication systems. In order to target the best 
dependable software techniques, an analysis of the 
behavior of the communication system when faults occur 
is needed.  
Some of the most critical components inside a 
communication network are the routing devices. In fact, a 
failure in one of this components can affect an entire 
subset of the network making impossible the 
communication between two points especially inside 
network not strongly connected. 
The objective of this work is the study and the 
classification of the behavior of an Open Source Router 
when a SEU (Single Error Upset) affects it. The proposed 
work aims at contributing to the definition of 
methodologies for enhancing the quality of services that 
are provided through network communication systems. 
The realization of the study proposed in this paper 
relies on a Fault Injection environment to inject faults 
inside the memory of the router and to observe its 
behavior in presence of a fault. Due to the distributed 
nature of the target system, the Fault Injector must be 
distributed as well, to collect results not only in the router 
but also in the clients connected to the router. 
The interest in Fault Injection techniques has lead to 
many researches about its applicability, validity, and 
possible applications. Many Fault Injection tools have 
been developed in the context of different researches. 
Messaline [1] has a design based on a formalized Fault 
Injection methodology. The result is a flexible testbed 
capable of simultaneously injecting multiple, pin-level 
faults into different target systems to collect coverage, 
latency, and error-propagation measurements. Fiat [2] and 
Ferrari [3] use software-implemented injections to 
emulate hardware faults. The Focus simulation 
environment [4] conducts fault sensitivity experiments on 
chip-level designs. Transient faults are injected through a 
runtime modification of the circuit. Depend [5] is a 
process-based simulator that provides a library of objects 
to behaviorally model a system’s hardware component. 
React [6] is a software testbed that abstracts 
multiprocessor systems at the architectural level. 
Despite the effectiveness of the previously listed tools, 
they are designed especially to inject faults into hardware 
systems. Our study requires a fault injection tool able to 
target distributed software systems. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines the 
network architecture, whereas Section 3 summarizes the 
proposed fault model. Section 4 describes the 
implementation of the fault injector. Sections 5, 6 present 
the experimental results, whereas Section 7 exploits some 
conclusion. 
2. The test case 
To set up a significant experiment, the following 
problems have to be faced: 
• selection of a “significant” network architecture, 
• selection of a proper router implementation, 
• selection of suitable traffic on the network in terms 
of both protocols and data. 
2.1. Network architecture 
One of the key points of the study proposed in this 
paper is the definition of the architecture of the network 
used to gather experimental results. Two opposite 
constraints need to be fulfilled. On one hand, the network 
should be simple enough to be easily manageable and 
controllable. On the other hand, it should be complex 
enough to reflect the characteristics of a real network. 
Trading-off these requirements, we selected the network 
architecture shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Network Architecture 
Despite its simplicity, the adopted architecture can 
reflect a real situation. In fact, if each host is considered 
not just as a single node of the network but as a complex 
subnet, we obtain a real and common scenario in which a 
certain number of different networks are connected 
together via a router, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Expanded Network Architecture 
 Each host then can be fatherly expanded, modeling the 
global networks mentioned in Section 1.  
2.2. Router implementation 
Looking at the proposed architecture, the key role of 
the router easily comes up. A fault in the router can totally 
isolate some portions of the network. 
Concerning the router implementation, the use of 
commercial devices is not feasible due to the usage of 
proprietary software, which makes necessary the use of 
expensive and complex hardware Fault Injector. 
Thus we opted for an Open-Source Router 
implemented on a PC running the Linux Operating System 
[7], equipped with multiple network interfaces. The 
advantage of using a Linux system is the possibility to 
access directly the router code and to use software fault 
injection techniques instead of the hardware ones. 
2.3. Traffic emulation 
To be able to deal with worst cases, the UDP (User 
Datagram Protocol) [8] will be used. UDP is a non-reliable 
transport protocol, thus not capable of correcting routing 
errors occurring in the transmitted packets.  
As far as the transmitted data are concerned, each client 
sends and receives packets to and from all the others 
clients. As previously explained, the datagrams are sent 
using the UDP protocol. The format of the payload is 
shown in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: Datagram Payload Format 
The first two fields contain the source and the 
destination address, respectively. The third field is a 
counter: its starting value is selected randomly the first 
time a datagram is sent, and then incremented each time a 
new datagram is sent to the same client. In this way, each 
client can check whether it received all the packets 
addressed to it, or not. The last field contains a predefined 
string, whose variable length is calculated as a function of 
the values of the previous fields. 
 
3. Fault Model 
The adopted fault model for the fault injection 
experiments is the transient fault Single Error Upset 
(SEU), consisting in temporally flipping one bit in one 
data memory location. 
The question of how much this fault model represents 
real pathologies induced by the occurrence of real defects 
is crucial. Several software-implemented fault injection 
studies are dedicated to the analysis of the relationship 
between fault injected by software and physical faults. In 
particular, both NASA [9] and IBM [10] made statistical 
studies about the most common error occurring in modern 
digital circuits. These studies lead to the conclusion that, 
due to the high miniaturization and the high work 
frequencies, today circuits are becoming more and more 
susceptible to the effect of ionizing radiation and noise 
source. Moreover, [9] and [10] reported SEU be one of the 
main observed effects. 
The effectiveness of the used fault model is increased 
when dealing with space applications, where routers need 
to be installed on satellites, where the probability of SEU 
is very high. 
4. Fault Injector 
To analyze the behavior of the network when a failure 
occurs, a system able to insert fault inside the router 
memory is needed.  
A usual problem in setting up Fault Injection 
environments is the definition of a significant fault 
injection policy, in terms of where and when faults have to 
be injected. Analyzing the router memory structure we 
identified four different memory areas: 
1. Network Packet 
2. Code Segment 
3. Routing Table 
4. Local Data Segment. 
Before entering implementation details, let’s make a 
brief analysis of the potential effects of faults in these 
different areas. 
Errors detection in the network packets is a well know 
problem in telecommunication community. All the 
standard protocols used in the communication network 
implement error detection and correction mechanisms. 
Thus, an error analysis in this area is not necessary. 
All the others three areas are instead candidate targets 
for the fault injection experiments. In particular, the Code 
Segment and Local Data Segment need to be well 
analyzed.  
As a consequence of the injection of a fault, one can 
expect the following three main behaviors of the router: 
• The router still works properly: in this case the fault 
is either still latent or it has been overridden. These 
faults are not interesting because they don’t affect 
the router behavior. 
• The router still works, but the packets are not routed 
correctly: these errors are most likely due to a fault 
in the router’s Routing Table. Once again, this kind 
of faults is not so critical since, due to their 
occurrence, packets are either routed on longer paths 
or, in the worst case, lost. To investigate anyhow this 
class of faults, as described in section 2.3, we 
adopted the UDP Protocol that, being a non-reliable 
protocol, is not able to correct routing errors. 
• The router crashes: this is the worst situation due to 
the isolation of some network areas and to the 
consequent high recovery time. 
 
To fulfill the above-mentioned constraints, the Fault 
Injector has been implemented as a kernel daemon of the 
Linux OS. The fault injection process is split into several 
steps, summarized by the pseudo-code in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4: Fault Injector Pseudo Code 
During the fault injection all the clients connected 
transmit and receive a lot of datagrams, to verify the 
effects of the fault on the network behavior. 
When a client receives a datagram, verifying its 
correctness, it can detect: 
• errors due to packets loss, using the datagram 
counter 
• transmission error, checking the string length. 
System crashes can be detected by periodically 
checking the router liveness from the clients. If the router 
does not respond for a certain time period, the clients 
assume the server crashed. Then the router has to be 
rebooted. 
Whenever a packet is received, a log file is updated 
storing the time of reception, the counter number, and the 
correctness of the packet. After each experiment, all the 
log files produced by the clients are analyzed to check for 
any possible transmission error. 
5. Experimental results 
This section presents some statistical result obtained 
injecting SEU in the router memory. In particular, a single 
fault at a time has been inserted into a randomly selected 
bit of each byte of: 
• Code Segment, whose size is 10,624 bytes 
• Local Data Segment, which is split into two regions: 
initialized data (7,316 bytes) and not-initialized data 
(BSS=Below Stack Segment, 1,860 bytes).  
A preliminary analysis of the memory was made and 
the router’s internal variables (Figure 5) classified as: 
• Simple variables (integer, char, float), used as 
indexes, accumulator, counter, etc. 
• Data pointer 
• Functions pointer. 
To assure the validity of the obtained results, each 
experiment has been repeated four times.  
Analyzing the log files created by the clients during the 
injection experiments, we clustered the behaviors 
according to the target memory regions: 
• Code Segment: faults injected in this area produce 
three different system behaviors: 
− No-effects: the system still works properly 
− Critical error: the routing functionalities are 
interrupted, but the Operating System is still 
active. These kinds of error are not so critical, 
since it is possible to resume the router in a safe 
state without rebooting the system (Forward 
Recovering [11][12]) 
− Crash: the system has to be rebooted. In this area, 
we can further distingue between total crash (the 
system stops running in all the experiments) and 
partial crash (the system stops in a subset of the 
experiments, only).  
Table 1 summarizes the analysis of the injections in 
the Code Segment. 
Produced error Bytes  Percentage 
No-effects 6,352 59,8% 
Critical errors 1,168 11,0% 
Partial crash 2,944 27,7% 
Total crash 160 1,5% 
Table 1: Analysis of the Code Segment 
• Data Segment: the faults injected in the local 
variables of the router produce the following 
behaviors: 
− Non-Critical Variables: the system still works 
properly and all the packets exchanged are 
correctly transmitted 
− Critical Variables: the router sometime crashes 
and, thereinafter, all the clients do not receive any 
packets 
− Very Critical Variables: the router always 
crashes. 
 
Figure 6 shows the geographical distribution of the 
three different kinds of variables in the memory map, 
whereas Table 2 summarizes the analysis of the Data 
Segment. 
Looking at the result shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6 
one can establish a relationship between the variable class 
and the behavior of the system when that kind variable is 
corrupted. Normally the Function Pointers can be 
classified as Very Critical Variables, the Data Pointer as 
Critical Variables whereas Simple Variables normally fall 
in the category of Non-Critical Variables. 
Variable effect Bytes  Percentage 
Non-Critical 7,001 76,3% 
Critical 211 2,3% 
Very Critical  1,964 21,4% 
Table 2: Analysis of the Data Segment 
6. On-going work 
Some software dependability techniques will be applied 
on the router code in order to enhance the dependability of 
the router. The statistical study realized in this paper will 
be used as a benchmark to evaluate the effectiveness of 
these techniques.   
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we presented a classification of a router 
behavior in presence of SEU. The proposed work consists 
in the design and implementation of a network architecture 
and of a distributed Fault Injection environment, able to 
corrupt the router memory and to observe the fault effects 
on the distributed system. The network was implemented 
using an Open-Source router in order to allow direct 
access to the source code and to use software fault 
injection techniques.  
To get a comprehensive fault behavior classification, 
experiments were performed both in Data and Code 
Segments. 
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Figure 5: Variable distribution in the routerʼs memory  
 
Figure 6: Fault effects on the routerʼs memory 
